

ils correspondent minutieusement aux mots grecs précités $\dot{\alpha}\chi\acute{r}\nu$, $\dot{\alpha}\chi\eta\rho\varepsilon\varsigma$, $\dot{\eta}\chi\eta\rho\varepsilon\varsigma$ et $\kappa\tau\epsilon\alpha\tau\cdot\dot{\eta}\chi\eta\varsigma$, où l'on trouve donc aussi la notion de "vide, pauvre".

Mais les mots tokhariens sont avant tout précieux, me semble-t-il, parce qu'ils permettent de tirer gr. $\dot{\iota}\chi\alpha\varrho$ "desir violent" de son isolement morphologique: en effet tokh. A *ekär*, B *aikare* "vide" et A *ekro* "pauvre" sont aussi des thèmes en -*r*. A *ekär*, B *aikare* remonte à i.-e. **āi/ōiğh-ro-*, c.-à-d. à un ancien -*r*- thématisé (pour la classe thématique indo-européenne en tokharien, cf. Van Windekens, *Orbis* 15 [1966] 249ss.). A *ekro* a passé aux thèmes tokhariens en -*nt*- (cf. Krause-Thomas, *Tocharisches Elementarbuch* I, Heidelberg 1960, 155).

Il faut donc reconstruire i.-e. **iğh-r/n-* pour gr. $\dot{\iota}\chi\alpha\varrho$, $\dot{\iota}\chi\alpha\varrho\acute{a}\omega$ à côté d'i.-e. **āi/ōiğh-ro-* pour tokh. A *ekär*, B *aikare* (à l'origine sans doute aussi pour tokh. A *ekro*)¹⁾.

The semantic development of $\pi\acute{a}\sigma\chi\omega$

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Introduction

Despite the antiquity, frequency and versatility of $\pi\acute{a}\sigma\chi\omega$ in Greek, it is not easy to establish related words in other Indo-European languages. Its origins probably lie in an I. E. root **bhendh-* meaning "bind" (though Emile Boisacq has attempted, less convincingly, to derive it from a labio-velar **qʷn̥t-sko*, **qʷenth-*), and the range of English words 'band', 'bend', 'bind', 'bond', 'bund(le)' is probably connected. Greek inherited three grades of the root, represented by **penth-*, **ponth-* and **pñth-*, seen in *πενθέω*, *πείσομαι* (< **πενθ-σ-ομαι*), *πέπονθα*, and *ἔπαθον* (the weak grade in -*a*- from

¹⁾ Tout cela prouve aussi indubitablement, me semble-t-il, que lat. *aeger* „malade“ ne peut être intégré dans cette interprétation: il y a surtout des objections d'ordre sémantique.

*πάθ- > παθ-), though there is no evidence of their occurrence in Linear B.

The semantic structure and mechanics of the Greek language assured *πάσχω* of a place which could not in many of its uses be taken by other words.

Though active in form it was characteristically (though not invariably) passive in function, as may be seen in its common construction with prepositions to denote the agent, or less frequently, the instrument, in the same way as ἀποθνήσκω, κλύω, ἀκούω etc.

Homer

In Homer its most common, but by no means only use is to express 'suffering', usually mental, but sometimes physical (e.g. *Odyssey* XVIII. 224 ὅδε πάθοι ρυστακτύος ἐξ ἀλεγεινῆς). It is found both absolutely and in association with a limited number of adjectives used adverbially in the neuter plural, or, less commonly, singular, but once only with a true adverb in -ως at *Odyssey* XVI. 275 ἐν στήθεσσι κακῶς πάσχοντος ἐμεῖο. Many such instances are formulaic and of frequent occurrence, e.g. with πολλά, κακά, alone or in combination. In addition, a few nouns are found in formulaic pattern, singly or with stock epithets, such as ἄλγος, ἄλγεα, πάσχων (*Iliad* II. 667); ἀεικέλιον πάθεν ἄλγος (*Odyssey* XIV. 32); κρατέρ' ἄλγεα (*Iliad* II. 721, *Odyssey* V. 13 etc.); πῆμα — ἐπεὶ δὴ δηθὰ φίλων ἀπὸ πήματα πάσχω (*Odyssey* VII. 152); ἔργα — παθέειν τ' ἀεκήλια ἔργα (*Iliad* XVIII. 77). It is also juxtaposed in formulaic phrases with the virtually synonymous μογέω — πόλλα 'πάθον καὶ πολλὰ 'μόγησα (*Odyssey* VIII. 155).

This simple function of *πάσχω* to denote suffering persists throughout Classical literature, but even in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* instances of a much wider application may be discerned, though again emphasizing its passive nature. First, it is used as a passive of verbs of 'doing (something to someone)', e.g. *Odyssey* VIII. 490: ὅσσ' ἔρξαν τ' ἔπαθόν τε καὶ ὅσσ' ἐμόγησαν Ἀχαιοί, secondly, its use in the aorist subjunctive mood with the interrogative neuter pronoun τί; in the sense of 'what will happen?' (with pessimistic implication): *Iliad* XI. 404 ὃ μοι ἔγώ, τί πάθω; (cf. *Odyssey* V. 465); thirdly, the use of the aorist participle, again with the neuter interrogative pronoun τί; to denote 'why?'. Here there is a shift from 'being hurt' to 'being affected (through circumstances beyond one's own control)'.

There is one example in the *Iliad*, XI. 313:

τί παθόντε λελάσμεθα θούριδος ἀλκῆς;

and another in the *Odyssey*, XXIV. 106:

τί παθόντες ἐρημήν γαῖαν ἔδυτε;

(In contrast, the corresponding idiom τί μάθών; not found in Homer, indicates a situation within the subject's control.)

The pre-Socratic Philosophers

An examination of the fragments of the pre-Socratic philosophers reveals an extension of the usage of πάσχω as a passive of verbs of 'doing (to)' to that of a substitute or 'pro-verb' for the passive of a wide variety of verbs of action, a function which continues in regular and frequent use throughout Classical Greek literature. As such, it is, of course, impossible to find for it a single universal antonym.

Another interesting development is the use of πάσχω with inanimate subjects, whereas in Homer the subject of the verb was invariably a human or divine *person*. A good illustration from Democritus is cited in H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* 68B, 155 of a segmented cone: *ἴσα τμήματα ἔσται καὶ φανεῖται τὸ τοῦ κυλίνδρου πεπονθώς δὲ κῶνος* ('The sections will be equal and the cone will appear to have the same property as the cylinder.')

The Tragedians

In the plays of the Tragedians we find an increasing number of adjectives used adverbially in the neuter singular or plural to qualify πάσχω, and in addition an internal usage with the cognate nouns πάθος and πάθημα, which do not occur in Homer, but are both found in the pre-Socratic fragments.

Sophocles, *Electra* 210: οἵς θεός δέ μέγας Όλύμπιος / ποίνιμα πάθεα παθεῖν πόροι. O. T. 554: πάθημ' ὅποιον φῆς παθεῖν δίδασκε με.

Random examples of adjectives found with πάσχω in the works of the Tragedians are: ἄδικα, ἀελπτα, ἄθλια, ἀμήχανον, ἀνάξια, ἀπάλαμνον, ἀνυπέρβατον (κακόν), γενναῖα, δυσαχές (πάθος), δύσοιστα, ἔκδικον, ἐλάσσονα, λυπρά, περισσόν, πολέμιον, οἰκτρά, σχέτλια, τερπνόν, φλαῦρον.

A further development found in the Tragedies, though quite unknown in Homer, is the use of πάσχω in a 'good' sense. It occurs

with *eū* in Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 868: *eū δρᾶν, eū πάσχονσαν*, and there are previous instances in Sappho and Alcaeus. This becomes regular usage, and an extension is found in Theognis 1009, *κτεάνων eū πασχέμεν* where the meaning is 'enjoy', on the analogy of *γενόμαι* and *ἀπολαύω* which are also followed by the genitive case. Another similar instance is in Pindar, *Nemeans* I. 32: *ἔόντων eū τε παθεῖν καὶ ἀκοῦσαι*. It may be noted that here and in Aesch. *Eum.* 868 quoted above *πάσχω* is in combination with another verb with which *eū* is normal.

At *O.C.* 1498 *πάσχω* is used in a good sense as a pro-verb for the phrase *δικαίαν χάριν παράσχειν* which immediately precedes it: *δ γὰρ ξένος σε καὶ πόλισμα καὶ φίλους ἐπαξιοῖ / δικαίαν χάριν παράσχειν παθών* ('the stranger deems thee and thy city and thy friends worthy of fair requital in return for kindness received').

Frequent examples of *πάσχω* used passively with a preposition, to denote the agent, occur in the Tragedies, usually *πρός* or *ὑπό*, though the latter tends to become normal usage: Aeschylus, *Prometheus* 759, *οἴα πρός θεῶν πάσχω θεός*. Sophocles *O.C.* 892, *πέπονθα δεινὰ τοῦδ' ὑπὸ ἀνδρὸς ἀρτίως*.

The preposition *ἐν* is also employed by Sophocles, *Electra* 1029, where *πάσχω* serves as a pro-verb for *κλύω*:

Chrysosthemis: ἀνέξομαι κλύονσα χῶταν *eū λέγης*

Electra: ἀλλ' οὐ ποτ' ἐξ ἐμοῦ γε μὴ πάθης τόδε.

(This construction occurs in Homer, *Odyssey* II. 134: *ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς κακὰ πέισομαι*.)

In Sophocles *Electra* 390 we find: *ὅπως παθῆς τί χρῆμα*; an association which continues in prose and verse. It is to be regarded as a parallel to the cognate *πάθος*, but in an *active* sense, exactly as *πάσχω* serves as a passive for verbs of action, to which *χρῆμα* is a nominal counterpart. Later instances of *πρᾶγμα* used similarly will be cited.

It has already been noted that *πάσχω* was used by the pre-Socratic philosophers with a non-personal subject, and evidence that this was current usage is seen in Euripides *I.T.* 755: *ἔξαίρετόν μοι δὸς τόδ', ήν τι ναῦς πάθη*, and *Phoenissae* 244: *εἰ τι πείσεται ἐπτάπνυγος ἄδε γᾶ*. It should, however, be borne in mind that the personification of a ship is not unnatural, and a country may be regarded as a collective noun for its population.

A notable example of the use of *πάσχω* as a passive of verbs of action occurs in Sophocles *O.C.* 267:

κάμοιγε ποῦ ταῦτ' ἔστιν, οἵτινες βάθρων
ἐκ τῶνδέ μ' ἐξάραντες εἴτ' ἐλαύνετε,
ὄνομα μόνον δείσαντες; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε
σῶμα' οὐδὲ τάργα' τάμ'· ἐπεὶ τά γ' ἔργα μου
πεπονθότ' ἔστι μᾶλλον ἢ δεδρακότα.

In his *Lexicon Sophocleum* Ellendt observes on this passage: “Deinde insignem participii pro adjectivo dictionem.” The sense is clearly passive, and *πεπονθότα* appears to be used as a precise synonym for *δεδραμένα*, but is chosen by the author to emphasize the antithesis with *δεδρακότα* and possibly to avoid both *δεδραμένα* and *δεδρακότα* in the same line.

The Comic Poets

The Comic poets permit a glimpse of the vernacular, and it is not surprising to find in their works a much more flexible use of *πάσχω*. Its association with *εὖ* and a variety of adverbial adjectives indicating pleasant circumstances is quite regular, e.g. Aristophanes, *Peace* 591: *πολλὰ γὰρ ἐπάσχομεν πρὸν ποτ' ἐπὶ σοῦ γλυκέα καδάπανα καὶ φίλα*.

The sense of ‘experience’ (i.e., have something done to one) is also conveyed: *id.* 696: *πάσχει δὲ θαυμαστόν* (“something strange has happened to him”), and in Menander, *Dyscolos* 633: *ἴνα τὸ τοῦ λόγου πάθω* (“that it should happen to me as in the proverb”).

The association of *πάσχω* with impersonal and inanimate subjects, and abstract ideas, is seen commonly: Aristophanes, *Clouds* 234 (of earth and watercress [by ellipse]): *ἢ γῆ πάσχει δὲ ταῦτὸ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ κάρδαμα*, *id. Plutus* 550 (of ‘life’): *ἄλλ' οὐχ οὐμὸς τοῦτο πέπονθεν βίος, οὐμὰ Δί'*. Alexis¹⁾ (of fish), *τοίτων δ' ἀπολυθείς, κειμένων ἵχθυδίων / μικρῶν, τρεμόντων τῷ δέει τί πεῖσται. id.²⁾* (of fingers), *ἐνθυμούμενος / ὅτι δεῖ γυναικὸς ἐπιφερούσης δακτύλους / ἀπαλοὺς ὑπ' ἀκάνθης μηδὲ ἐν τούτων παθεῖν. Epicrates³⁾* (of eagles [by ellipse]), *πεπονθέναι δὲ ταῦτά μοι δοκεῖ / τοῖς ἀετοῖς*.

The idiom *τί πάθω*; first noted in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, remains current, but a shift of meaning from despair and perplexity to indifference has crept in: Aristophanes, *Birds* 1432:

Pisthetaerus: *νεανίας ἀν συκοφαντεῖς τοὺς ξένους;*

Sycophant: *τί γὰρ πάθω; σκάπτειν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι.*

(i.e. “Why not? What else should I do?”)

¹⁾ J. M. Edmonds, Collection of Greek Comic Fragments, 1957, Fr. 110

²⁾ *Id.*, Fr. 110.

³⁾ *Id.*, Fr. 3.

The phrase *τί (χρῆμα) πάσχεις*; is a colloquialism meaning “What’s the matter with you?” and *οὗτος (αὕτη) τί πάσχεις*; is used similarly. At the same time *τί*; with the aorist participle in the sense of ‘why?’, first noted in Homer, continues in use: Aristophanes, *Clouds* 340: *λέξον δή μοι, τί παθοῦσαι, / εἰ νεφέλαι γ' εἰσιν ἀληθῶς, θνηταῖς εἴξασι γυναιξίν;*

The cognate nouns *πάθος* and *πάθημα* remain in association with *πάσχω*, and in Menander⁴⁾ we also find *πέπονθα τὴν ψυχήν τι*, with which we may compare Pindar, *Nemeans* I. 46: *κραδίην εὖ πείσομαι*, and which supports this reading rather than the varia lectio *κραδίη*.

*Prose Authors: Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Demosthenes
and the Minor Orators*

An examination of the prose authors, from the pre-Socratic philosophers onwards, gives further evidence that *πάσχω* was regularly used with inanimate and non-human subjects. Herodotus, for example, employs it with reference to rivers: II. 20. 3: *πρὸς δέ, εἰ ἐτησίαι αἴτιοι ἥσαν, χρῆν καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ποταμόν, δοῖ τοῖσι ἐτησίησι ἀντίοι δέουσι, δμοίως πάσχειν καὶ κατὰ τὰντα τῷ Νεῖλῷ . . . εἰσὶ δὲ πολλοὶ μὲν ἐν τῇ Συρίῃ ποταμοί, πολλοὶ δὲ ἐν τῇ Αιγαίῃ, οἱ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο πάσχονται οἱρόν τι καὶ ὁ Νεῖλος, Animals, birds and fish, of which examples have already been noted in the works of the Comic poets, though somewhat sparsely, occur with increasing frequency. In II. 93. 4 Herodotus refers to the fish bruised by swimming too close to the banks of the Nile: *πάσχονται δὲ ταῦτα διὰ τόδε*, where *πάσχω* serves as a pro-verb for *τρίβονται*. In I. 197 Herodotus uses *πάσχω* for a generic description of suffering pathologically, opposed to *κάμνω*, which is regularly used by Hippocrates to denote illness (though without implication of pain, which is expressed by *πονέω*): *προσιόντες ὅν πρὸς τὸν κάμνοντα συμβουλεύονται περὶ τῆς νούσου, εἴ τις καὶ αὐτὸς τοιοῦτον ἔπαθε ὀκοῖον ἀν ἔχῃ δέ κάμνων ἀ ήλλον εἶδε παθόντα.* A similar juxtaposition is to be seen in Thucydides II. 48. 3 (of the Plague): *αὐτός τε νοσήσας καὶ αὐτὸς ἴδων ἄλλον πάσχοντας*.*

In a corrupt passage of Herodotus (VI. 119. 4) it has been suggested by J. E. Powell in his *Lexicon Herodoteum* that *πάσχω* may mean ‘permit’: *ἢν μέντοι ἐπίη καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἡμετέρην ἀρξη τε ἀδικέων, ἥμεῖς οὐ πεισόμεθα*. Alternative readings are *οὐκ οἰσόμεθα* and *οὐ*

⁴⁾ *Id.*, Fr. 209.

περιοφόμεθα, and, again, πείσουμαι may be from πείθομαι, but an interesting parallel is to be found in Thucydides VI. 104. 3, ὁ δὲ Νίκιας πνθόμενος αὐτὸν προσπλέοντα ὑπερεῖδε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν νεῶν, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ Θούριοι ἔπαθον. ("When Nicias realized that Gylippus was sailing up he scorned the size of his fleet, as the Thurians had done.") Here ἔπαθον serves as a pro-verb for ὑπερεῖδε, a transitive verb. This may be explained as a characteristically loose Thucydidean clause which, if expanded, would be "the same miscalculation from which the Thurians had suffered".

The calque with *patiōr* in Latin and 'suffer' ("little children") in English is tempting, and similar usage is to be found in Isocrates *To Demonicus* 31: μηδὲ τὰς χάριτας ἀχαρίστως χαριζόμενος, ὅπερ πάσχοντιν οἱ πόλλοι. The phrase πάσχειν τι is used frequently for 'perish', by meiosis. In Homer the construction is invariably limited to verbs of 'fearing' and did not necessarily imply death as distinct from calamity. e.g. *Iliad* X. 25/26: Μενέλαον ἔχε τρόμος / μή τι πάθοιεν, where death is feared, but *Odyssey* IV. 820: δέιδια μή τι πάθησιν, where death is not explicit.

In Thucydides VI. 33. 4 πάσχω is employed as a passive pro-verb for βλάπτω, οὕτε γὰρ βλάπτειν ἡμᾶς πλείω οἰοί τ' ἔσονται ἢ πάσχειν.

A further development in the use of πάσχω by Thucydides is the apparent rejection of πρός to denote agency in favour of ὑπό, though in VI. 11. 5 we find ἐς denoting 'as regards', 'in respect of' rather than specific agency: ὅπερ νῦν ὑμεῖς, ὃ Αθηναῖοι ἐς Ἀκεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους πεπόνθατε. In VII. 61. 2 πάσχω indicates a state of mind: ἀθυμεῖν δὲ οὐ χρῆ οὐδὲ πάσχειν ὅπερ οἱ ἀπειρότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. There is, however, a distinction between the use of the verb here and the found in Xenophon, *Mem.* I. 2. 30, for example, νίκων αὐτῷ δοκοίη πάσχειν, "to behave like a pig".

The association of πάσχω with inanimate objects continues in Thucydides, e.g. with νῆσοι in II. 102. 3: ἐλπὶς δὲ καὶ πάσας (νήσους) οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ ἀν χρονῷ τοῦτο παθεῖν. Isocrates employs it with νοῦς in *Demonicus* 52: (cf. βίος in Aristophanes, Plutus 550) and (by ellipse) with ἄρματα: ὅταν γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ὑπὸ οἴνου διαφθαρῇ, / ταντὰ πάσχει τοῖς ἄρμασι τοῦς ἡριόχους / ἀποβαλοῦσιν, and in *Against the Sophists* 12 we have: τὸ δὲ τῶν λόγων πᾶν τούναντίον πέπονθεν "exactly the opposite is the case with the art of discourse."

The Orators develop a specialized legal usage of the aorist participle of πάσχω to indicate the 'plaintiff' as apposed to the 'defendant' (ὁ δράσας). Isocrates, *Against Lochites* 2: ἐπειτα τῶν μὲν

ἄλλων ἐγκλημάτων αὐτῷ τῷ παθόντι μόνον δὲ δράσας ὑπόδικος ἔστιν. Attention has been drawn to the internal use of *χρῆμα* with *πάσχω* in Sophocles, *Electra* 390, and examples of a similar construction with *πρᾶγμα* are found in Herodotus, the Comic poets and Orators. Herodotus I. 114. 5, ἀνάρσια πρήγματα ἔφη πεπονθέναι. Menander, *Dyscolos* 954, *πρᾶγμα* πάνδεινον παθών. Demosthenes XXI. 17, *πράγματ' αἰσχιστ'* ἀν ἐπάθομεν. In such instances, the emphasis must be placed rather on the *action* taken against the subject than on the *suffering* or *experience* itself, which would be rendered by *πάθος*, *πάθημα*.

In *Panathenaicus* 230 Isocrates uses *πάσχω* as a pro-verb for *συνίημι*: καὶ πεπονθὼς τὸ γεγραμμένον ἐν Δελφοῖς. An interesting parallel to the example quoted from Sophocles *O.C.* 267 is seen in Aeschines III. 182, where *πάσχω* is seen as a supplementary passive participle for a verb of 'doing': ἐν τῇ μνήμῃ τῶν εὖ πεπονθότων. ("in memory of benefits received"). Here *πεπονθότων* is precisely synonymous with *δεδραμένων*.

Xenophon makes vigorous employment of *πάσχω* with inanimate subjects, animals, parts of the body and abstract ideas. Examples are: *χώρα*: *Hunting* XII. 9, τὴν χώραν πάσχονταν κακῶς. (cf. γῆ, *Oeconomicus* XX. 14). *σώματα*: *Symposium* II. 25 (and plants, by ellipse): δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν σώματα ταῦτα πάσχειν ἄπερ τὰ τῶν ἐν γῇ φυομένων. *ψυχή*: *Memorabilia* I. 2. 21: ή ψυχὴ πάσχοντα. *χείρ*: *Horsemanship* XII. 5: ή ἀριστερὰ χεὶρ ἦν τι πάθη. *ἴππος*: *id.* IV. 15: ὅταν τι χαλεπὸν πάσχωσιν (sc. ἵπποι). In *Cyropaedia* VII. 1. 27 there is a particularly noteworthy example of this association, since the agent is also animal: τοιαῦτα γὰρ πάσχοντιν ἵπποι ὑπὸ οὐαμήλων. (Other animals are a hare at *Hunting* V. 12 and 29, and pigs *id.* X. 23.). *δίαιτα*: *Cyropaedia* VIII. 2. 6 τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο πέπονθε καὶ τὰ ἀμφὶ τὴν δίαιταν. From the sense of 'experience' there develops the concept of 'behave': *Memorabilia* II. 1. 5: οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι αἰσχρὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ ταῦτα πάσχειν τοῖς ἀφρονεστάτοις τῶν θηρίων. The process is 'be treated' > 'experience' > 'be in the same position (as)' > 'behave (as)' (cf. νῆκὸν αὐτῷ δοκοίη πάσχειν from *Memorabilia* I. 2. 30 quoted above).

An extension of this sense by the addition of *πρός* with the accusative case means 'to have emotion towards': *Symposium* IV. 11, εἰ . . . καὶ νύμεις τὰ αὐτὰ πρός ἐμὲ πάσχετε.

We have noted the function of *πάσχω* as a pro-verb for other verbs both active and passive, and in Xenophon we find it serving

for a number of intransitive active verbs⁵⁾). In *Memorabilia* II. 1. 18, for example, it replaces *διψάω*, *πεινάω* and other verbs denoting unspecified physical privation: *ἢ ὁ μὲν ἐκὼν πεινῶν φάγοι ἀν δόπτε βούλοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐκὼν διψῶν πίοι καὶ τᾶλλα ὠσαύτως, τῷ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης πάσχοντι οὐκ ἔξεστιν δόπταν βούλεται πανέσθαι.*

It is important to bear constantly in mind when considering the unique position of *πάσχω* in the Greek vocabulary, the semantic anisomorphism of languages. Thus though context and sense may demand various translations of a word such as *πάσχω* into another language such as English, this does not imply that a Greek would have made differentiations in his mind corresponding to what would be different senses of the word to an Englishman. This is not necessarily connected with the richness or poverty of a language, and Greek certainly did not suffer in the same way as Latin from *patrii sermonis egestas*, though it did lack alternatives for the passive of *αἰσθάνομαι*, *οἴδα*, *μαρθάνω* and *ἐπίσταμαι*, a deficiency which *πάσχω* was admirably suited to make good.

The application of *πάσχω* became extended without any corresponding change in the process of thought of the speaker or writer, and overlapped increasingly the semantic fields of many other words which also in turn experienced the usual shifts of meaning. A greater knowledge of the spoken language might reveal *πάσχω* in a very different light from that in which we are able to judge it from the comparatively limited written evidence available to us.

⁵⁾ F. G. Sturz in his *Lexicon Xenophonticum* Vol. III p. 472 cites a scholiast in Aristophanes' *Clouds* 234 (*πάσχει δὲ ταῦτὸ ταῦτο καὶ τὰ κάρδαμα*)

“τὸ πάσχειν οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ τῶν πασχόντων εἰ λέγεται
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ποιούντων. καὶ γὰρ οἱ ποιοῦντες
τρόπον τινὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ πάσχουσι πάθος, αὐτὸ τὸ ποιεῖν.”

It would, however, seem more logical to have commented “πάσχουσι πρᾶγμα” rather than *πάθος*, but the observation is nonetheless valid, and may give the key to the idiom *τί πάθω*;

A parallel may be drawn with the English ‘do’, which serves as a pro-verb for almost any other, transitive or intransitive, e.g. “Can I go now?” “Yes, do.” “The river has flooded some of the islands and will do so to the rest.” It is normal English usage to substitute ‘do’ in the second of two clauses instead of repeating the same verb. There is a syntactic parallel with the use of the pronoun ‘it’. It can also be used thus as a counterpart for a passive verb, but only when the verb is formed with the auxiliary ‘get’, e.g. “shall I get (myself) dressed now?” “Yes, do.”

Plato and Aristotle

The later philosophers Plato and Aristotle found *πάσχω* singularly appropriate for the expression of abstract ideas. For example, it may denote the consequence of the action of an abstract, but is little used by the philosophers to express physical or mental suffering. e.g. *Republic* V. 451B: ἀλλ', ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εάν τι πάθωμεν πλημμελές ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου. Other examples of abstract subjects of the verb are found in *Philebus* 13E with φρόνησις, ἐπιστήμη and νοῦς, with ἡ τριάς in *Phaedo* 104A, τὰ γράμματα in *Sophist* 253A, ἥδοναί in *Hippias Maior* 300B, ἐπίγραμμα in *Phaedrus* 264D, τὸ πρεσβύτερον ('age') in *Politics* 1259.b.17.

It is particularly in the semantic field of emotion, behaviour and sensory perception that *πάσχω* was most usefully employed by the philosophers, since Greek lacked or did not find necessary the variety of words used in English to translate its different senses. *Gorgias* 485A, καὶ ἔγωγε δμοιότατον πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς φελλιζομένους καὶ πάίζοντας. Again, the most common use of the verb by Aristotle is to denote a passive state in contrast to action; *Generation and Decay* 323.a.19. εἴπερ τὸ ποιῶν ἀντιθήσομεν τῷ πάσχοντι. He also uses it in the sense of 'having an attribute': *Metaphysics* 1037.b.17: ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀνθρωπος καὶ λευκὸν πολλὰ μέν ἔστιν ὅταν μὴ ὑπάρχῃ θατέρῳ θάτερον, ἐν δὲ ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ καὶ πάθῃ τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον δὲ ἀνθρωπος, for 'function' or 'characteristic' of plants or inorganic bodies in *Meteorologica* 390.a.18, δμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα, οἷον χαλκὸς καὶ ἀργυρός· πάντα γὰρ δυνάμει τινί ἔστιν ἢ τοῦ ποιεῖν ἢ τοῦ πάσχειν, ὥσπερ σὰρξ καὶ νεῦρον. (The infinitive with the article here serves an identical purpose with that of the cognate noun *πάθος*), for 'chemical or physical reaction': *Meteorologica* 371.a.25: διὸ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀντιτυπήσαντα πάσχει τι, τὰ δὲ μὴ οὐδὲν οἷον ἀσπίδος ἥδη τὰ μὲν χάλκωμα ἔτακη, τὸ δὲ ξύλον οὐδὲν ἔπαθεν.

The perfect participle is again used as an alternative for the perfect passive participle of *δράω* by Aristotle, of which we have already noted instances in Sophocles and Aeschines: *Physics* 245.b.14, τὸ δὲ πεπονθός καὶ ἡλλοιωμένον προσαγορεύομεν ("we call it qualitative modification"). From this usage develops the sense of 'being qualified' (of descriptions): *Metaphysics* 1024.b.31, ἐκάστον δὲ λόγος ἔστι μὲν ὡς εἰς δὲ τοῦ τι ἦν εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ ὡς πολλοί, ἐπεὶ ταῦτο πως αὐτὸ πεπονθός, οἷον Σωκράτης καὶ Σωκράτης μουσικός.

From the passive sense of *πάσχω* used as the converse of verbs of action it is not unexpected to find it employed to denote the

female or passive partnership in sexual intercourse: *Problems* 879. b. 31, καὶ ὅσοις μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ἔδραν, οὗτοι πάσχειν ἐπιθυμοῦσι, ὅσοις δ' ἐκ' ἀμφότερα, οὗτοι δρᾶν καὶ πάσχειν. The use as a pro-verb for other verbs, both active and passive, is again seen at *Meteorologica* 372. a. 24 for νομίζω, οἴομαι: καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν μὲν ἵσις γίγνεται νύκταρ δ' ἀπὸ σελήνης, ὃς μὲν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ὄντο, οὐκ ἐγίγνετο, τοῦτο δ' ἔπαθον διὰ τὸ σπάνιον. (cf. *id.* 373. b. 7). Both these examples have the feature, now rare in the philosophers, of personal subjects.

Finally, in Categories 2 und 5 the meaning is very close to that of grammatical passive⁶⁾, for which the grammarians later regularly employed πάσχω: κεῖσθαι δὲ οἷον ἀνάκειται πάθηται· ἔχειν δὲ οἷον ἀποδέδεται, ὥπλισαι, ποιεῖν δὲ οἷον τέμνει, καίει· πάσχειν δὲ οἷον τέμνεται, καίεται.

Conclusion

It is hoped that this short review of the use of πάσχω by representative authors covering the period from Homer to about 300 B.C. will have served to demonstrate the unique position which it held in the Greek language.

In the 9th Edition of Liddell and Scott the first quoted meanings of the word are “to have something done to one”, “to suffer”, but it must not be assumed that this implies any ‘radical’ sense. The uses made of a word by those who speak the language in which it occurs are the sole arbiters, and πάσχω fulfilled many other ‘functions’ besides those cited above, as we have seen.

Subject to these reservations, however, a study of this kind must have an historical perspective, showing the directions in which a word has moved semantically over a period of time and the reasons for such shifts, the availability or absence of synonyms, borrowings, new demands upon the language made by fresh ideas, thoughts and mental concepts. S. Ullmann observes in his *Principles of Semantics*⁷⁾ that “a word may retain its previous sense and at the same time

⁶⁾ A scholiast to Dionysius Thrax Grammatici Graeci, scholia Vaticana (Stephani), para 12, 880, 6b. p. 243 l. 23 (περὶ ὀνόματος) states: ἐροῦμεν ὅτι πολλάκις εἰσὶ δηματικὰ ὀνόματα, ἔξοντα τὴν διάθεσιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννοίας, καὶ ὃς ἀλλαχοῦ εἰρήκαμεν, ὅτι τὰ δήματα, τοντέστι τὰ πράγματα, ἀποτελοῦμεν ἄνθρωποι ἢ ὃς πάσχοντες ἢ ὃς ἐνεργοῦντες, and another *id.* para 13, 885b. p. 245 l. 29 and 246 l. 24. (περὶ δήματος): ἢ γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες τι ποιοῦμεν ἢ ὃς πάσχοντες, and, τὸ ἐπόμενον τούτων εἶπεν δι τεχνικός ἀπὸ τοῦ προηγούμενου προηγεῖται γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τοῦ πάσχειν. διάθεσις οὖν τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ παθεῖν καὶ ἡ μέση διὰ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα ἔχει.

⁷⁾ Chapter IV, p. 174.

acquire one of several new senses", and L. Bloomfield⁸⁾ says that refined and abstract meanings largely grow out of more concrete meanings.

At first it appears to have been of somewhat restricted application, as appears in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. For instance, the subjects of $\pi\alpha\sigma\chi\omega$ are always persons, human or divine, but this restriction is not found in the works of the pre-Socratic philosophers, and becomes associated quite regularly with inanimates, animals, birds, fish and abstract ideas.

The somewhat stylized Epic poetry of Homer did not necessarily reflect the contemporary spoken language, however, and there is evidence in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* of the use of $\pi\alpha\sigma\chi\omega$ as a passive for verbs of 'doing (to)', from which perhaps developed the idiomatic $\tau\acute{i}\ \pi\alpha\vartheta\omega\nu$; i.e. 'what is being done to me that etc. . . .' Later this sphere of operation widens and it becomes a passive pro-verb for a number of verbs, both transitive and intransitive.

Apart from instances of complete conformity of linguistic mechanics between one language and another, it is usually necessary to seek various translations for words such as $\pi\alpha\sigma\chi\omega$ when used in different senses in another language such as English. This does not, however, imply that such distinctions would have been apparent to a Greek, knowing no other language, and using $\pi\alpha\sigma\chi\omega$ as a comprehensive word for which we, in English, must employ a number of hyponyms. For example, $\delta\eta\mu\iota\o\nu\gamma\iota\alpha$ was universally applicable in Greek to the skill, craft, profession, trade of a musician, cobbler, doctor, pilot, general, etc., for which we must find different words in English, and must classify $\tau\acute{e}\chi\nu\eta$ in our own minds into separate functions accordingly.

J. Lyons says⁹⁾: "One might suppose for instance that the native speaker of Classical Latin would have been in some doubt as to whether 'altus' had one or two senses (because of its different antonyms). It would hardly be suggested, however, that he was ever in doubt as to the meaning of 'altus' in a given context." I do not accept this pronouncement, or think that a Roman would have compartmentalized in his mind, as it were, the 'senses' of *altus*. The word meant to him 'high深深'. Similarly a Classical Greek would not have split $\pi\alpha\sigma\chi\omega$ into a number of arbitrary semantic headings. An interesting parallel is the use of the word 'extreme' in English. We may, for example, refer to an 'extreme' temperature

⁸⁾ *Language*, p. 429.

⁹⁾ *Structural Semantics* 4. 7.

(hot or cold), or to a man of 'extreme' political views (e.g. Anarchist, Communist, Fascist), but there can be no suggestion that an Englishman mentally divides 'extreme' into separate isolated categories. The word is of universal application, instinctively used as appropriate according to context, just as a Roman would have used *altus* for 'high' or 'deep', or a Classical Greek would have used *πάσχω* in many ways for which, in English, because of a different set of linguistic mechanics, we are obliged to seek various translations. This point is illustrated by C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards¹⁰⁾: "when scholars say 'chien' means 'dog', they *should* say that 'chien' and 'dog' both mean the same." Similarly, Sir Alan Gardiner¹¹⁾ says, "In uttering a word the speaker necessarily offers to the listener the whole range of its meaning . . . To take an example: if I say 'ball', this word comes to my listener charged with the possibility of cannon-ball, football, tennis ball as well as a dance, and much else. It remains for the listener to select from the whole range of meaning offered that aspect or part of it which suits the context or situation."

Though *πάσχω* underwent a considerable semantic expansion and development during the period reviewed, it nevertheless remained subject to strict syntactic limitations, as we have seen. In short, it is a philological paradox. It might, at first sight, appear strange that a word of such obvious importance in the Greek language should have few certain affinities in other Indo-European languages. This was, however, largely due to the mechanics of Greek itself, in which *πάσχω* was peculiarly well suited to fill certain specific semantic lacunae. There is ample evidence from Homer onwards to indicate that its semantic potentialities, beyond a verb denoting 'suffer', were recognized and exploited, as may be seen, for example, in the idioms *τι πάθω*; and *τι παθών*;

In discussing metaphor, Sir Alan Gardiner¹²⁾ says that something more remote, less concrete, less vivid, is referred to in terms of something similar which is more familiar, less abstract, more pictorial. He shows how a word may extend beyond its original function because its suitability for further adaptation was recognized and accepted. He cites the English 'silver' which was no doubt originally only a noun, but is rightly classified in the Oxford Dictionary as an adjective as well. Similarly the old Latin noun

¹⁰⁾ *The Meaning of Meaning*, Chapter V.

¹¹⁾ *The Theory of Speech and Language*, Chapter I, 12.

¹²⁾ *The Theory of Speech and Language*, Chapter III, 46 and 47.

ridiculum took on masculine and feminine endings as its originally incongruent functions as an attribute of persons became congruent. Inner word-form, in other words, is always the cause of outer and not vice versa. In such a way it may be that *πάσχω* came to be used in a number of ways that would have been incongruent in Homeric Greek, and here, perhaps, lies the key to the adoption of *πάσχω* by the philosophers, for example, for metaphysical purposes, beyond its simple sense of 'suffer' or 'having something done to one'.

ἄμβων/ἄμβη and Latin umbo

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When Scaliger commented on the word *umbo* that “Graeci vocant quicquid extumidum est et prominet, ut ventrem ampullarum Plutarchus Lycurgo. In montibus quoque ὑψηλοὺς τόπους ita vocant, itque quidam poeta vetus sic scripserat,—ἐπ’ οὐραῖς ἀμβώνεσσι sic quoque Latini umbonem in eam significationem usuparunt,” he was almost certainly thinking of Varro, *De ling. lat.*, V, 24. 116: *umbonis a graeco, quod ambonis*, but he may well have considered that the connection was no more than a verbal association and that the words were in fact unrelated¹⁾. Readers of Forcellini, *s.v.* *umbo*, will see that he has accepted Varro; Stephanus, at the end of the article *ἄμβη*, expresses some doubt, quite rightly, but Amar and Lemaire, “teste Varrone,” have no hesitation in seeing the Greek *ἄμβων* behind Latin *umbo*²⁾.

Were information forthcoming from the etymologists there would be no cause for speculation. But of modern researchers only those who concern themselves in what Puhvel once called “the treacherous everglades of pre-Hellenic linguistics” (*Glotta*, XXXIV, 1955, p. 40) have expressed much confidence in the once alleged connec-

¹⁾ Scaliger in M. Ter. Varronis, *De Lingua Latina libri*, Vol. II, p. 82 (Biponti, 1788). Compare C. G. L., V. 528 (Goetz): *umbonibus summitatibus vel altitudinibus cuiuslibet rei vel medietatibus scutorum unde derivatus est umbilicus*. I owe this reference and others, as well as most helpful comments, to Professor R. Renahan, who of course does not necessarily subscribe to my conclusions.

²⁾ Amar and Lemaire, note at Statius, *Theb.*, I, 377 (Vol. II of their edition, Paris, 1825). Cf. *Glossaria Latina*, III, p. 88.